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One of the most interesting questions concerning modern contract lawyers is whether, and if so when, there may 
be a duty on parties to a contract to negotiate in good faith? This may seem an odd question for an English 
lawyer to raise, granted the refusal of the House of Lords in Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 A.C. 128 to recognise 
even the effectiveness of an agreement to negotiate in good faith but this case has not escaped cogent criticism 
(Neill (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 405) and it rests on an axiom (that this is a duty which cannot be enforced) which 
might appear self-evident if the plaintiff seeks specific performance but looks very different if what the plaintiff 
seeks is compensation for wasted expenditure. (Note that this was not what the plaintiff in Walford v. Miles 
sought.) 
It is often forgotten how expensive the contract making process can sometime be. A good example arises where 
the contract is let by competitive tender. To bid accurately and successfully for a multi-million pound project 
may easily involve spending tens if not hundreds of thousands of pounds. The clear general rule is that such 
expenditure is for the tenderer’s account (in effect the successful tenders pay for the unsuccessful) but this 
assumes a fair tendering process. 
This was recognised in the Court of Appeal in Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v. Blackpool Borough 
Council [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1195 where it was held that, by its manner of advertising and arranging the award of 
the holiday tours contract at the municipal airport, the Council had implicitly undertaken to comply strictly with 
its announced method of analysing the tenders. This could not unreasonably be characterised as an implicit 
adaptation of good faith values. 
This approach has now been carried a stage further both in explicit legal analysis and in application of the 
substantially more complex facts by Finn J. of the Federal Court of Australia in Hughes Aircraft Systems 
International v. Air Services Australia (1997) 146 A.L.R. 1. 
The defendants were the successors of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), an Australian public corporation 
which was involved in the award of the Australian Advanced Air Traffic System acquisition contract. The 
competition for the award was reduced to two contenders, the plaintiff’s (Hughes) who were a Californian 
company and Thomson Radar Australia Corporation Limited (Thomson), and Australian subsidiary of the well 
know French company. In due course, the CAA awarded the contract to Thomson. 
In the invitation to tender in February 1993, the CAA stated, inter alia, that the parties’ best and final offers 
would be evaluated in accordance with specified major and minor criteria; it prescribed priority rankings for the 
evaluation process and strict confidentiality would be maintained. Finn J. held that the defendant had not taken 
any proper account of the priority rankings set out in the criteria and it had allowed Thomson to make a 
substantial reduction in its price at a late stage in the bidding. 
Hughes formulated its case in a number of different ways. The one which is significant here relates to the 
contractual obligations of the CAA in relation to the bidding process. Finn J. held that by stating in such formal 
terms that it would apply the stated criteria the CAA came under a contractual obligation scrupulously to apply 
the criteria. He further held that in the circumstances an implied term that the CAA should conduct the tender 
evaluation fairly as between Hughes and Thomson would easily pass the standard tests for the implication of 
terms and that such a term should normally be implied in a competitive tender process contract, especially one 
involving a public body. 
This result should not surprise nor should the reasoning alarm an English audience. One may draw attention 
however to one dog that did not bark in the night. The plaintiffs argued their case entirely in private law terms. It 
is clear that the tendering process must also have been potentially susceptible of public law remedies. In this sort 
of area the interaction of public and private law calls for exploration. 
 
